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There is no doubt that new investments are the cornerstone of progress
and competition in today’s world. Different financing instruments are em-
ployed to secure the funds for these investments. The most common fi-
nancing methods in Iran are debt and equity financing. Some investors,
including corporate insiders, have access toprivateinformation. Themore
private the information, the more will be the bid/ask spread between in-
vestors, thus reducing the returns of those with no access to such informa-
tion. Therefore, information asymmetry is expected to affect the funding
of investments. The purpose of this study was to examine the relationship
between information asymmetry and financing methods (debt and equity
financing). The population consists of all the firms listed on the Tehran
Stock Exchange that have been operating during the period 2006–2010.
Totally, 61 firms were selected as sample using targeted sampling. The re-
sults showed that there is no significant relationship between information
asymmetry and debt financing; however, there was a significant positive
relationship between information asymmetry and equity financing.
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Introduction
Economicentitiesneedlargeinvestmentstosustaintheirviabilityandde-
velop their activities. These entities also highly depend on financial mar-
kets for financing their activities. Therefore, choosing the right financing
methods is an important issue for financial managers. This study intro-
duces different methods of financing and examines the role of informa-
tion asymmetry on the financing of firms.
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Industrial development in any country entails short-term, mid-term,
and long-term planning and investment. The resources required for in-
vestment can be secured from retained earnings, bank loans, selling
stocks, and/or a combination of these sources.
One of the goals of financial management is to maximize shareholder
wealth. Thus, financial managers must find ways of securing the funds
necessary for achieving these goals (Abzari, Dastgir and Gholipur 2008).
This study investigates the financing approaches of firms to reveal the
effect of information asymmetry on the choice of financing methods.
In financial reporting, the main purpose of financial statements is to
provideinformationaboutthefinancialstate,performance,andflexibility
of a business unit, thus helping the users of these statements in decision-
making. A part of the ownership of firms is in the hands of shareholders.
This group mainly relies on publicly available information such as finan-
cial statements for monitoring the performance of managers. However, a
portion of the shareholders has access to valuable information about the
business strategies and long-term investments of the firms.
Well-informed shareholders are those with access to private informa-
tion, such as managers, analysts, and institutions and individuals who
provide such information. Less informed investors, also called retail in-
vestors, are common people whose only way of access to information is
through the reports provided by the firms. Differences among investors
arise from the signals that they receive about the value of future funda-
mentals. All investors receive a common public signal about the value of
future fundamentals, but a proportion of these investors also receive a
private signal about this value.
However, just a small portion of well-informed investors is enough to
drive the market price of a share toward the real value. Obviously cur-
rent profits do not reflect the result of all the economic activities of a
firm. There are activities such as long-term sale contracts, investments,
and r&d, which are of long-run value. Information about these activi-
tiesisonlyprovidedtoinstitutionalinvestors,thusleadingtoinformation
asymmetry between institutional investors and retail investors (Khoshti-
nat and Yusefi 2008).
Information asymmetry often arises from investment opportunities.
It provides the opportunity for income smoothing and wealth transfer to
managersthroughinternaldealsandbonuses.Highergrowthopportuni-
ties increase expected future cash flows, thus increasing the information
asymmetry between managers and shareholders. Thus, identification of
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the right financing method is of utmost important in maximizing share-
holder wealth.
One of the most important parts of any economic activity is its financ-
ing. Required funds can be secured from equity of debts. The debt eq-
uity mix (the left-hand side of a firm’s balance sheet) indicates the capi-
tal structure of the firm. If debt is the source of financing, its use in the
capitalstructureoffirmsincreasesreturnonequity.Increasingreturnus-
ing financial leverage increases the firms’ ability to compete. Under these
conditions, the decision to use debt in the capital structure is a critical
one, for increased debt may increase the firm’s risk if return on invest-
m e n ti sl o w e rt h a nt h ea m o u n tb o r r o w e d .D e c i s i o n sa b o u tt h efi n a n c i a l
structure of a firmaffectits value.As shareholders, managersmust adjust
the structure a firm to minimize the cost of capital and maximize share-
holder wealth and firm value.
On the other hand, a major factor in decision-making is the informa-
tion relevant to the matter at hand. If the necessary information is asym-
metricallydisclosedamongtheusers,itcanleadtodifferentviews onthe
same matter. Therefore, more important than information it is how the
information is distributed (Ghaemi and Vatanparast 2005).
When information asymmetry on the stocks of a firm increases, the
inherent value of the stocks will differ from the value given to the stocks
by investors in the capital market. Therefore, the real value of stocks will
be different from the value expected by shareholders. It must be noted
that the majority of investors are common people who can only access
important information through the reports provided by the firms. Those
with better access to information, like information about the returns and
investments of the firm, will be able to affect the process of supply and
demand, leading to the so-called ‘spread’ in prices.
Review of the Literature
Akerlof (1970) brought informational issues at the forefront of economic
theory. He showed that information asymmetry could increase adverse
selection in the market. Glosten and Harris (1988) found that adverse se-
lectionispositivelyassociatedwiththedegreeofinformationasymmetry
in the market. Subsequently, Stoll (1989) provided evidence that 43 per-
cent of bid/ask spread is due to adverse information in the market. Giet-
zman and Ireland (2005) examined the relationship between disclosure
and the cost of capital in the uk. They found a negative relationship be-
tween disclosure and the cost of capital, but this relationship exists only
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forfirmsadoptingaggressiveaccountingpolicies.ZhangandDing(2006)
alsofoundanegativerelationshipbetweendisclosureandthecostofcap-
ital.
Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that managers know more about the
firm’s value of assets and opportunities than potential investors do. They
also assume that managers act in the interests of existing shareholders.
Since managers act in the interests of existing shareholders, there is an
incentive to sell newequity when it is overvalued. Thus, selling equity on
averageconveysnegative information about thefirm,andthestock price
drops at the equity issue announcement.
Ambarish,JohnandWilliams(1987)showedthatannouncementeffect
ofnewstockdependsontheroleofassetsinplaceandinvestmentoppor-
tunities. For instance, the announcement effect is negative for firms with
private information primarily about assets in place andpositive for firms
with inside information mainly about opportunities to invest.
Some researchers have studied the leverage effect of financing activi-
ties. Modigliani and Miller (1963) argue that issuing new stocks reduces
stock prices if debt levels are reduced. According to this theory, issuing
new stocks reduces financial leverage. Due to losing tax advantage be-
cause of equity financing, leverage decreases with stock prices, and the
decrease in stock prices is positively associated with the relative size of
the issue.
Eberhart and Siddique (2002) studied long-run bond returns follow-
ing securities offerings. Distinguishing between pure and partial wealth
transfer, they showed that abnormal firm returns are negative following
equity offerings, and much of the shareholder wealth loss represents a
wealthtransfertobondholders,supportingthepartialwealthtransferhy-
pothesis.
The special role of banks as the financial intermediaries has received
m u c ha t t e n t i o ni nt h el i t e r a t u r e .F o ri n s t a n c e ,D i a m o n d( 1 9 8 4 )a r g u e d
that the key advantage of banks for investors is their access to private
information, reducing information asymmetry among different groups
operating in the market.
Mikkelson and Partch (1986), James (1987), and Lummer and Mc-
Connell (1989) showed that bank loan announcement creates positive
abnormalstockreturnsfortheborrowingfirms.James(1987)investigated
the reaction of stock prices to bank loan announcements. He found that
positive stock price response to the announcement of new bank credit
agreements that is larger than the stock price response associated with
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announcements of private placements or public straight debt offerings.
He also found significantly negative returns for announcements of pri-
vateplacementsandstraightdebtissues usedtorepaybankloans.Others
f o l l o w edu pt h i ss t u d y .L u m m e ra n dM c Co n n e l l( 1 9 8 9 ) ,f o ri n s t a n c e ,d i s -
tinguished between new bank loans and loan renewals. They found that
thepositiveresponseofstockpricesonlyholdstrueforthelatter,i.e.loan
renewals.
Bharath, Pasquariello and Wu (2009) found a significant positive rela-
tionshipbetweeninformationasymmetryandtheuseofdebtinthecapi-
talstructureoffirms.Yumei,ChunfengandZhenming(2007)studiedthe
effect of information asymmetry on the financing of Chinese firms and
foundasignificantpositiverelationshipbetweeninformationasymmetry
and debt ratio (short-term, long-term, and total).
Van Buskirk (2012) studied the effect of frequency of disclosure on the
level of information asymmetry among investors. Studying a sample of
firms in the us retail sector, he found that more detailed (greater quan-
tity) disclosure is associated with reduced information asymmetry.
Francis, Nanda and Olsson (2008) showed that the cost of equity is
negatively related to the disclosure measure based on annual reports and
10-k filings, positively related to disclosure measures based on manage-
ment forecasts and conference calls, and unrelated to press-release based
disclosure measures.
Fama and French (2002) and George and Hwang (2010) found that
leveragebasedonbookvalueisassociatedwithlowerreturns,whilelever-
a g eb a s e do nm a r k e tv a l u ei sa s s o c i a t e dw i t hh i g h e rr e t u r n s .
A recent study by Fulghieri, Garcia and Hackbarth (2013) shows that
equity can dominate debt if both the asset in place and the growth option
are subject to the type of asymmetric information that is similar to what
we examine here.
Fulghieri, Garcia and Hackbarth (2013) investigate the optimal secu-
rity design problem under more general distributions of firm values, al-
though information asymmetry in their model is not time varying. In
contrast, we focus on the choice between debt and equity, study time-
varying asymmetric information, and associated delays in investment.
Rouhi et al. (2010) found that information asymmetry is not signifi-
cantly changed post seasonal profit announcement compared to pre sea-
sonalprofitannouncement.Thisisobservedinrelationtoannouncement
containing good news as well as bad news. Kashani Poor, Mehrani and
Oashanejad(2010)showedthatcompanieswithmoreindependentboard
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structure and more effective board approach have more market liquidity
compared to other companies. In fact, companies with higher score in
terms of corporate governance quality experience lower ask-bid spread
and higher different share supplied and demanded.
Methodology
The present research is an applied study that examines the relationship
betweeninformationasymmetryandfinancingmethodsinIranianfirms.
It is a non-experimental or correlational research with ex post facto de-
sign.
hypotheses
Thepresentresearchinvestigatestherelationshipbetweenbid/askspread
and the choice of debt or equity financing to find whether information
asymmetry has any effect on the choice of financing method. To answer
this question, the following hypotheses can be developed:
h1 There is a significant relationship between information asymmetry
and debt financing.
h2 There is a significant relationship between information asymmetry
and equity financing.
population and sample
The population of the present research consists of all the firms listed on
Tehran Stock Exchange (tse) during the period 2006–2010 that satisfy
the following conditions:
• Firms’ financial year must end on the final day of Iranian calendar;
• Firms must have been listed in tse before 2006
• Firms with at least three months of trade interruption are excluded;
• Firms must have available data on bid/ask prices.
data collection
Therequireddatawasextractedfromthefinancialstatementsofthesam-
ple firms and was analyzed in Excel and Stata.
variables
The independent variable is information asymmetry, which is calculated
from the model developed by Venkatesh, and Chiang (1986) for measur-
ing bid/ask spread:
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spreadit =
ap− bp
(ap + bp)÷ 2
× 100, (1)
where spread denoted bid-ask spread, ap is the ask price for firm i in
the period t, and bp is the bid price for firm i in the period t.
To measure information asymmetry between investors, the model de-
veloped by Vankatsh and Chiang (1986) is used to determine bid-ask
spread range. This model has been used in different studies. According
t ot h em o d e l ,t h eh i g h e rr a n g eo fa s k - b i ds p r e a dt h em o r ei n f o r m a t i o n
asymmetry (Rezazadeh and Azad 2008).
Thedependentvariablesaredebtfinancingandequityfinancing.Debt
financing is obtained from the following equation:
Dt= dt−dt-1, (2)
whereDt denotesdebtfinancinginperiodt,dt isdebtfinancinginperiod
t,a n ddt−1 is debt financing in the period t − 1.
Equity financing is obtained from the following equation:
S = C1 − C0 − A,( 3 )
where S denotes equity financing, C0 is capital before capital gain, C1 is
capital after capital gain, and A is the percentage of capital gain from
shareholders’ cash earnings.
data analysis
F-testisappliedtochoosebetweenpaneldataandpooled data.InF-test,
if the calculated F is lower than the table value of F, panel data is used
and vice versa. If panel data is used, Hausman test must be applied. This
testshowswhethertheinterceptrepresentsfixedorrandomeffects.Ifthe
p-value in Hausman test is lower than 5, the null hypothesis (random
effects) is rejected and fixed effects method is used and vice versa.
Based on the results of F-test and Hausman test the proper regres-
sion method is selected and the hypotheses are analyzed accordingly. In
panel data, the models may exhibit heterogeneity of variance. Fixed ef-
fects method automatically solves this problem. However, if random ef-
fects method is used, generalized least squares (gls) regression must be
applied for estimating the model. The following model is used for exam-
ining the relationship between the variables:
Yit = β0 + β1spreadit + εit,( 4 )
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table1 TheResultsofF-test for the First Hypothesis
Test Test Statistic p-value Result
F-test 0.34 1.00 Pooled data
where Yit is the dependent variable and spreadit is the bid-ask spread
for firm i in year t (as a measure of information asymmetry).
Results
hypothesis 1
According to the first hypothesis, there is a significant relationship be-
tween information asymmetry and debt financing. The statistical repre-
sentation of this hypothesis is as:
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
h0:bs = ˆ βs
h1:bs  ˆ βs
.( 5 )
The results of F- t e s tf o rt h efi r s th y p o t h e s i sa r es h o w ni nt a b l e1 .
As shown in table 1, the p-value for F-test is 1.00 (p > 0.05). In other
words, the calculated F is less than the table value of F. Therefore, this
hypothesis is tested using the pooled method. The results obtained from
analyzing the data in Stata software are summarized in table 2.
The results show that there is a positive relationship between infor-
mation asymmetry and debt financing. However, this relationship is not
statistically significant at the 95 confidence level. The value of F indi-
cates the overall validity of the model. The data in table 2 shows that the
calculated F i sg r e a t e rt h a nt h et a b l ev a l u eo fF (p < 0.05). Thus, we can
argue thatthe modelhas a high validity. The coefficient of determination
forthis modelis 11,suggesting that 11ofthechangesin thedependent
variable can be explained by the independent variable.
hypothesis 2
Based on the second hypothesis, there is a significant relationship be-
t w e e ni n f o r m a t i o na s y m m e t r ya n de q u i t yfi n a n c i n g .T h es t a t i s t i c a lr e p -
resentation of the second hypothesis is as follows:
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
h0:bs = ˆ βs
h2:bs  ˆ βs
.( 6 )
T a b l e3p r o v i d e st h er e s u l t so fF-test for the second hypothesis.
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table 2 The Results of Pooled Regression for the First Hypothesis
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-statistic p-value
Information Asymmetry 0.175 0.123 1.44 0.118
Constant 0.597 0.031 18.93 0.000
notes F-statistic (probability): 5.07 (0.0062); R2: 0.11.
table3 TheResultsofF-test for the First Hypothesis
Test Test Statistic p-value Result
F-test 0.90 0.7054 Pooled data
table 4 The Results of Pooled Regression for the Second Hypothesis
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-statistic p-value
Information Asymmetry 0.412 0.132 3.10 0.002
Constant 0.606 0.029 20.97 0.000
notes F-statistic (probability): 9.63 (0.0021); R2:0 . 1 2 .
As shown in table 3, the p-value of F-test is 0.7054 (p > 0.05). In
other words, the calculated F is lower than the table value of F.T h e r e -
fore, pooled method is again used for testing the second hypothesis. The
results of analyzing the data in Stata are shown in table 4.
The data in table 4 shows that there is a positive relationship between
information asymmetry and equity financing. This relationship is statis-
tically significant at the 95 confidence level. This shows that a unit of
change in equity financing leads to 0.412 increase in information asym-
metry. As mentioned earlier, F shows that overall validity of the model.
The data in table 4 shows that the calculated F is greater than the table
value of F (p < 0.05), indicating the high validity of the model. The co-
efficient of determination is 12, suggesting that 12 of changes in the
dependent variable can be explained by the independent variable.
Conclusion
This study examined the relationship between information asymmetry
and debt/equity financing within companies listed on the Tehran Stock
Exchange. The results showed that information asymmetry is positively
associated with debt financing, but the relationship was not significant.
However, there was a significant positive relationship between informa-
tion asymmetry and equity financing.
Previous studies have shown that less information asymmetry among
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investors indicates a fair market where both institutional and retail in-
vestors have equal access to information. Sellers and buyers of shares en-
t e rs u c ham a r k e tw i t hg r e a t e ri n f o r m a t i o n .T h i sm a r k e te n a b l e sf a i rd i s -
tribution of profits among people, thus increasing justice in the society.
Future Research Directions
• Itisrecommendedthatasimilarstudy isconductedconsideringin-
dustries or firm sizes (small, average, large).
• It is recommended that a study be conducted to evaluate the rela-
tionship between ownership structure and information asymmetry.
• Itisrecommendedthatfutureresearchersstudytherelationshipbe-
tween Number of buyers and sellers and information asymmetry.
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